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JOSEPH O'MEARA

ABORTION:

THE COURT DECIDES

A NON-CASE

I. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY
It took the Supreme Court 105 years to discover that the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a personal right of privacy that
invalidates state statutes forbidding abortion except to save the
mother's life.' As Mr. Justice Rehnquist pointed out, in a dissent
that no member of the Court attempted to answer, at least thirtysix states had such anti-abortion statutes when the Fourteenth
Amendment was adopted.2 None was attacked on the ground that
they offended the newly adopted amendment. The only conclusion
possible from this history is that the drafters did not intend to
Joseph O'Meara is Dean Emeritus, Notre Dame Law School.

AuTro's NoTE: This article is sharply critical, but nothing derogatory is intended. The author reveres the Court as an institution, and regards its members

as able, dedicated men. In the Abortion Cases, however, they took the wrong fork
in the road, as will be demonstrated by what follows.
Much credit is due Miss Patricia O'Hara, a 1974 graduate of Notre Dame Law
School, for the excellent job she did in researching some of the material used
in this paper. Mrs. Katherine Farmann, Law Librarian at Notre Dame, produced,
as if by magic, cases and other materials from scraps of information culled from
the press. Dr. George Godersky and Dr. Hun-Koo Cho, highly regarded gynecologists and obstetricians in South Bend, Indiana, were most helpful in explaining
medical aspects of abortion.
1From 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, to 1973, when Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (the Abortion Cases) were decided.
2410 U.S. at 174-75.
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have the Fourteenth Amendment withdraw from the States the

power to legislate with respect to this matter."'
It was only in the recent past that a small but clamorous band
began to agitate for abortion on demand.4 In Roe v. Wade, the

Court has yielded to the pressure of this strident minority. Mr.
Dooley once wrote that even the Supreme Court follows the election returns. Mr. Dooley to the contrary notwithstanding, in these
cases-indefensible on any ground-the Court disregarded the election returns in the only states in which the abortion issue has recently been on the ballot. In 1972, in Michigan and North Dakota,
crushing majorities voted against abortion.5 Moreover, in light of
recent congressional action,6 it is hard to believe that what the
3 Id. at 177.
4The abortion crusade began in 1966 or thereabouts. Its roots no doubt go
several years further back. LADER, ABORTION II: MAKING THE REvOLUrION (1973).
5 HLGERS, INDUCED ABORTION 19 (2d ed. 1973).
6
The Legal Services Corporation Act of 1974, P.L. 93-355, § 1007(b) provides
that: "No funds made available by the Corporation under this title, either by
grant or contract, may be used-(8) to provide legal assistance with respect to
any proceeding or litigation which seeks to procure a non-therapeutic abortion
or to compel any individual or institution to perform an abortion, or assist in
the performance of an abortion, or provide facilities for the performance of an
abortion, contrary to the religious beliefs or moral convictions of such individual
or institution; ... "
A similar provision is contained in the Health Programs Extension Act of
1973, P.L. 93-45, § 401(c); and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, P.L. 93-189,
§ 114, provides: "None of the funds made available to carry out this part shall
be used to pay for the performance of abortions as a method of family planning
or to motivate or coerce any person to practice abortions."
Moreover, Congress has quietly been passing with little public notice a series
of anti-abortion amendments tacked onto other legislation. See, e.g., Boston
Evening Globe, 26 March 1974, p. 11, col. 1.
In May 1972 the New York Legislature voted to repeal that state's abortion
law, passed in 1970, which legalized abortion on demand until the twenty-fourth
week of pregnancy. The repealer was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller. New
York Times, 14 May 1972, p. 1, col. 1. Since then the 1970 law has been amended
to provide that (1) after the twelfth week of pregnancy abortions must be performed in a hospital, and only on an in-patient basis, and (2) after the twentieth week a second physician must be present "to take control of and provide
immediate medical care for any live birth that is the result of the abortion." New
York Times, 16 June 1972, p. 1, col. 3.
A month later the Pennsylvania legislature, by a wide margin, passed a bill
restricting abortions in that state. The bill was vetoed by Governor Shapp. The
veto was overridden by a vote of 41 to 8 in the Senate, 157 to 37 in the House;
and the bill is now law. Among its provisions: Except for therapeutic abortions
(1) a married woman must obtain the consent of her husband, and (2) no abor-
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Court has legislated would be passed by Congress or approved by a
popular referendum. To be sure, the Court ought not to be a political weather vane. It owes allegiance to the Constitution, not to
the electorate. Nevertheless, the will of the people, as expressed at
the polls and by the legislatures they choose, is relevant. It is relevant because it demonstrates that the right to an abortion is not "so
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental." And the Court acknowledged in Wade that
"only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' . . . are included in [the
constitutional] guarantee of personal privacy" which the Court has
8
created.
II. PRIVACY: WHAT IS IT?
The word "privacy" is defined as follows in Webster's
Third New InternationalDictionary (Unabridged):
I a :the quality or state of being apart from the company or

observation of others

: SECLUSION

(unwilling to disturb his

[.]) b :isolation, seclusion, or freedom from unauthorized
oversight of observation (protected by law in the enjoyment
of []) 2 archaic : a place of seclusion or retreat: private
apartment (remote woodland privacies) 3 a: private or clan-

destine circumstances : SECRECY: b archaic : a private or personal matter : SECRET 4 obs : FAMILIARITY, INTIMACY 5 privacies pl, archaic : GENITALIA,

PRIVATES

Thus, like the flowers that bloom in the spring, privacy has nothing
to do with the case.
If it is agreed, arguendo, that privacy does have something to do
with the case, the question remains: What basis is there, in the Contion may be performed after the fetus is viable; (3) in the case of a therapeutic

abortion of a viable fetus, precautions must be taken to insure that it is aborted
alive; (4) taking the life of a premature baby aborted alive is second degree

murder punishable by life imprisonment; (5) except in emergency situations,
before undergoing an abortion a woman must sign a statement affirming that
she has been advised, among other things, that "there may be detrimental physi-

cal and psychological effects which are not foreseeable"; (6) advertising or soliciting for abortions is forbidden, as are fees for abortion referrals. Philadelphia
Inquirer, 11 September 1974, p. 1, col. 1. In October, the Massachusetts legislature

overrode Governor Sargent's veto of an abortion bill.
7Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
8 410 U.S. at 152.
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stitution or in the cases, for holding that the role of privacy diminishes as pregnancy lengthens until the fetus becomes viable (capable
of surviving outside the mother's womb)? According to Mr. Justice Blackmun, this occurs between the twenty-fourth and twentyeighth weeks of pregnancy, usually the latter, that is, after about
seven months. When viability is achieved, privacy apparently runs
out, in consequence of which, state legislatures are free to forbid
abortion except to preserve the life or health of the mother."° We
are not informed what basis there is for holding that the role of
privacy declines from absolute dominance at the beginning of pregnancy to zero importance at viability. The conclusion is a judicial
invention based on legislative not judicial considerations. There is
nothing private about a hospital abortion-a fact which Mr. Justice
Blackmun seems not to understand. The admissions office must be
told that the patient is entering the hospital for surgery, and the
name of the surgeon must be given. So the admissions office will
know. And, of course, everybody in the operating room will know.
Every surgical procedure-even a routine tonsilectomy-involves
risks. To guard against the risks common to all operations and those
peculiar to abortions, all the nurses on the surgical service must be
told. Anything else would render the hospital, and perhaps the surgeon, liable for damages in case of untoward circumstances. Thus,
a very considerable number of hospital personnel will know-will
have to know.
No, there is nothing private about an abortion. Yet privacy is
what makes an abortion legal. What an upside down use of the
English language!
If the abortion is not performed in a hospital, but in a facility
such as a clinic, required by the state to possess all the staffing and
services necessary to perform the operation safely, the number of
persons "in the know" might be somewhat reduced. It still would
be true that there is nothing private about an abortion.
It is appropriate to call attention at this point to the fact that the
women who challenged the constitutionality of the Texas and
Georgia statutes did so under fictitious names. Why? The obvious
answer is that they wanted privacy in the usual and commonly understood meaning of that term. Anonymity had a value to them. Is
it not ironical that each won her case on the ground that the statutes
9 410 U.S. at 160.

1o N. at 163-64.
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she attacked invaded her right of privacy? "When I use a word,
Humpty Dumpty said ... it means just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less."" Mr. Justice Blackmun has proclaimed his
solidarity with Humpty Dumpty.
In Doe v. Bolton,1 2 Mr. Justice Douglas said that the right of privacy was called by Justice Brandeis (dissenting in a wiretapping
case) the right "to be let alone." But in the present context, that
proves too much. Is there a right "to be let alone" while committing
a felony, or disturbing the peace, or doing any other unlawful act?
So the right "to be let alone" begs the question, which is whether
abortion is lawful when a state has made it a crime. The Court
simply legislated the legality of abortion and, in seeking a basis for
this usurpation of legislative power, seized upon the right of privacy as its reason.
Mr. Justice Blackmun conceded that the "Constitution does not
explicitly mention any right of privacy."' 3 Nevertheless, he said
that: 14
[T]he Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy,
or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist
under the Constitution ....
[O]nly personal rights that can
be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" . . . are included in this guarantee of personal
privacy.
To support these propositions he cited a long line of cases. But
a few pages later, the learned Justice flatly contradicted himself,
saying:' "
The pregnant woman cannot be isolated in her privacy. She
carries an embryo and, later, a fetus, if one accepts the medical definitions of the developing young in the human uterus....
The situation therefore is inherently different from marital
intimacy, or bedroom possession of obscene material, or marriage, or procreation, or education, with which Eisenstadt,
Griswold, Stanley, Loving, Skinner, Pierce, and Meyer were
respectively concerned.
These were among the cases cited in the preceding paragraph to
support the Court's propositions about privacy. 6
11 CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS, c.

12410

U.S. 179, 213 (1973).

4 Ibid.

VI.

13410

1 ld. at 159.

U.S. at 152.
16 Ibid.
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In his dissent in Miller v. California'7 Mr. Justice Douglas said:
"The difficulty is that we do not deal with constitutional terms,
since 'obscenity' is not mentioned in the Constitution or Bill of
Rights." Neither is "privacy" mentioned in the Constitution or
Bill of Rights. The dissenting opinion of the eminent jurist in Miller
cannot be reconciled with his concurring opinion in Bolton. Consistency demands that he change his vote in one or the other case.
Like crabbed age and youth, they cannot live together.
Our nation is approaching its bicentennial. From the beginning,
there have been rights "so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"'-rights "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty."' 9 They are proclaimed in the
Declaration of Independence. But we have not had from the beginning a constitutional right to an induced abortion. On the contrary, abortion was a crime for over a century, that is, from 182 120
until 22 January 1973, when the Court discovered that we had all
been wrong all along and that rights we have had from the birth
of our country entitle a pregnant woman to an induced abortion.
The Abortion Cases are regressive. They contravene Ferguson v.
SkMpa.21 In that case, Justice Black, speaking for the Court, declared: "We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs
for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws. 12 2 But the majority in the Abortion Cases did just that. It
substituted its judgment for the judgment of the Texas and Georgia
legislatures. Mr. Justice Stewart mentioned this in his concurring
opinion in Wade, but felt bound by Eisenstadt v. Baird23 which
24
recognized:
"[T]he right of the individual, married or single, to be free
from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." That right necessarily includes the right of a
woman to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
17413 U.S. 15, 40 (1973).
18291 U.S. at 105.
19 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
20 Mr. Justice Rehnquist, in Wade, pointed out that the first state law dealing
directly with abortion was enacted by the Connecticut legislature in 1821. 410
U.S. at 174.
21372 U.S. 726 (1963).
23405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
2
2 d. at 730.
24410 U.S. at 169-70.
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And that, in turn, necessarily means abortion on demand.
IlL. THE MOTHER
Mr. Justice Blackmun all but weeps about the miseries of
motherhood:'5
Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman
a distressful life and future. Psychological harm may be imminent. Mental and physical health may be taxed by child
care. There is also the distress, for all concerned, associated
with the unwanted child, and there is the problem of bringing
a child into a family already unable, psychologically and
otherwise, to care for it.
Mr. Justice Blackmun seems unconscious of the fact that women
want children. The few who don't, and those who don't want any
more, need not become pregnant. In view of easily available contraceptive devices, there is only a minimal possibility of an unwanted pregnancy.26 It is incredible that not a single member of
the Court mentioned this everyday fact of life. On the contrary,
the majority decided on an either/or basis, either the miseries of
motherhood or abortion.
Doe v. Bolton holds that a pregnant woman has a constitutional
right to an abortion if a continuation of the pregnancy would endanger her life or seriously and permanently injure her health, according to the best clinical judgment of a duly licensed physician.
The Court had previously held that the word "health" includes
psychological as well as physical well-being and is not unconstitutionally vague.
What then is "health"? The World Health Organization has
given us the answer: "Health is a state of complete physical, mental, and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
28
infirmity."
U.S. at 214-16.
26 The pill is better than 98 percent effective. The IUD is better than 96 percent effective. The diaphragm is 95 percent to 97 percent effective. The condom,
when used with contraceptive foam, is better than 97 percent effective. These
figures are taken from BAsics OF BIRTH CONTROL, a pamphlet produced and distributed by Planned Parenthood.
25 Id. at 153. Mr. Justice Douglas likewise sheds a tear. 410

27 United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
28

Constitution of the World Health Organization,in YEaooK oF Tm UNrnao
NATIONS 1946-47, Annex III, p. 793.
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Mr. Justice Blackmun seems to agree:-"
We agree with the District Court... that the medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors-physical,
emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age-relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may
relate to health.
In view of the breadth of the meaning of health, as defined by
the World Health Organization, and the statement by Mr. Justice
Blackmun in which he uses much the same language, a pregnant
woman is constitutionally entitled to an abortion for any reason or
no reason-that is, abortion on demand. For approximately the first
three months she needs no reason or excuse. 30 Thereafter she needs
only to imagine, or magnify, or invent, some complaint and so persuade a practitioner, which will not be difficult, to do the procedure.
She may be telling the truth; she may be a hypochondriac; she may
be malingering. These possibilities present a real diagnostic problem
that may resist solution. But time is of the essence. If there is to be
an abortion, the sooner it is done the better; the longer it is put off
the more dangerous it becomes. And remember that, according to
the Court's opinion, not only physical but emotional, psychological,
and familial factors, as well as the woman's age, are relevant for
diagnostic purposes. 31 So the pressure is very great to perform the
abortion she insists on. And remember, too, that "[i]nduced abortions are a source of easy income for doctors. ' 32 All this adds up to
abortion on demand.
33
Yet, in his concurring opinion in Bolton the Chief Justice said:
I agree that, under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, the abortion statutes of Georgia and Texas impermissibly limit the performance of abortions necessary to protect the health of pregnant women, using the term health in
its broadest medical context....
•.. Plainly the Court today rejects any claim that the Constitution requires abortion on demand.
And Mr. Justice Blackmun said: 34 "Roe v. Wade, supra, sets forth
our conclusion that a pregnant woman does not have an absolute
s0 d.at 164.
31 ld. at 192.
Abortion in Japan after 25 Years, 14 MrencAL WourL NEws 37 (9 November

29 410 U.S. at 192.
32

1973).
33 410 U.S. at 207, 208.

34 Id. at 189.
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constitutional right to abortion on her demand." It is a pity that
neither Mr. Justice Blackmun, who wrote the Court's opinion, nor
the Chief Justice, seems to have understood what the Court decided.
If a woman is poor she is entitled to an abortion at the public
expense. In Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center, 5 a United
States District Court held invalid a directive of the New York
welfare commissioner that the defendant medical center refuse to
perform abortions unless the procedure was medically indicated.
The Supreme Court remanded the cases (both the commissioner
and the medical center appealed) for further consideration in light
of Wade and Bolton36
In primitive times... family life was dominated by the supreme power possessed by the father, which was lawfully
exercised not only over the slaves of his household, but also
over his wife and children. The pater familias had the option
either to acknowledge the children borne by his wife (in
which case he took the new-born child in his arms and raised
it with a gesture that endowed it with legitimacy) or else to
expose them out of doors, leaving them for anyone who
wished to take them, which, in practice, amounted
to con3
demning them to death, or at the best, to slavery. 7
The Supreme Court has endowed the modern woman with the
same brutal power before her baby's birth that the Roman father
possessed after his baby's birth.
So in response to the argument that abortion protects the mother's health, the Japanese experience indicates that her health may
be adversely affected by termination of her pregnancy. Japan
passed its Eugenic Protection Law in 1948. The following year
250,000 legal abortions were performed. In 1972 there were no
fewer than 1.5 million abortions. What has been the effect? Dr.
35347

F. Supp. 496 (ED. N.Y. 1972). Not all states will pay the bill. See

Butler, The Right to Abortion under Medicaid, 7
1974).
36412 U.S. 925, 926 (1973).

CLEARNGHOUSE

Rv. 713 (April

37

GRAIT, THE CIVILIZATION OF Ro m 119 (1963). See also CARCOPINO, DAILY
LIFE IN ANCIENT RoAm 77 (1940): ". . . until the beginning of the 3d century,

when abandoning a child was considered the equivalent of murder, he [the Roman
father] might expose his new-born child to perish of cold and hunger or be devoured by dogs on one of the public refuse dumps unless it was rescued by the
pity of some passer-by."
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T. A. Ueno, a professor at Tokyo's Nihon University, believes
that 8
the sudden change from pregnancy causes an imbalance of
the sympathetic nervous system and has many other ill effects. Among them: dysmenorrhea, sterility, habitual spontaneous abortion, extrauterine pregnancies, cramps, headaches,
vertigo, exhaustion, sleeplessness, lumbago, neuralgia, debility
and psychosomatic illness, perforation of the uterus, cervical
lesions, infections, bleeding, and retention of some tissue.
"We can now say the law is a bad one," he told the International
Academy of Legal and Social Medicine meeting in Rome; "The
sooner Japan returns to a solid law which forbids the taking of the
' 38a
life of the unborn, the better for our nation.
The ill effects of abortion have become plain elsewhere as well: 3
While abortion on demand is a growing trend in the U.S.,
another nation with a long history of free abortion-Czechoslovakia-has recently begun to tighten its liberal policy.
One reason: a rising incidence in premature births due to
cervical scarring, which is the legacy of repeated abortion.
Until recently, 6% of premature deliveries were the result
of cervical incompetence; that figure has risen to 9% and continues to mount, according to a Czech official. To a large extent, the situation can be explained by the fact that only one
Czech woman in ten uses any kind of contraceptive measure.
Most count on their gynecologist to do the job. .... 39a
38 Note 32, supra. ".... a growing number of women are turning against abortion. According to a survey conducted by the Prime Minister's Office, more
than half of all married women have had at least one abortion. Of these 88 percent were against them. Forty percent said 'they were bad and should not be
permitted,' while 48 percent felt that 'abortions were not good but could not
be avoided.'"
'Women now want something better than abortion. They want reliable means
of preventing unwanted pregnancies." Pearce, Birth Crisis Seen in Japan, South
Bend Tribune, 26 July 1974, p. 15, col. 1.
38a Note 32 supra.
39 Czechs Tighten Reins on Abortion, 14 MEDICAL WORLD NEws 106H, 106J (12

October, 1973).
39a In Japan "About half the Japanese women who have abortions admit that they
did not even try to prevent conception." See note 32, supra. The evidence, therefore, is squarely against Dr. Alan F. Guttmacher, president of Planned Parenthood,
who said in a recent article: "Those who favor liberalization want to substitute
safe abortion for the dangerous, clandestine variety, until contraception is so
widely practiced that unwanted pregnancy-and therefore the need for abortion
-disappears." (Emphasis supplied). See the November 1973, issue of RPx.a's
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Drs. Vedra and Zidovsky [of the Institute for the Care of
Mother and Child in Prague] are doubly concerned about the
uprising in premature deliveries because their institution is
known for high-quality obstetric care. The perinatal mortality rate stands at only 18 per 1000, one of the lowest in the
world. And 70% of perinatal mortality can be attributed to
prematurity, they stress.
Repeated abortion can have two effects: The cervix can
become damaged and weakened, leading to spontaneous abortion or premature delivery; or the cavity of the endometrium
can become damaged, leading to the formation of scar tissue
and to spontaneous abortion....
Another consequence of the abortion situation which Drs.
Vedra and Zidovsky have noticed: a growing number of children born prematurely who must attend special schools because they are not as intelligent as their full-term peers.
IV. THE FATHER
The embryo does not put itself into the mother's uterus; it
is begotten by a man. The child is as much his as hers; it is theirs.
Has the father no right to a voice in the abortion decision? Inexplicably the Court completely disregards this question, except for
Mr. Justice Blackmun's statement: "We are aware that some stat40
utes recognize the father under certain circumstances."
The fact is that the Court itself has recognized rights of the
father. It has held in three recent cases that an unwed father has
a Fourteenth Amendment right to a hearing in custody and adoption proceedings. In Stanley v. Illinois" the Court held unconstitutional Illinois statutes which presume that an unmarried father is
unfit to have the care and custody of his offspring, and therefore is
not entitled to a hearing as to his fitness in fact. Mr. Justice White
42
there said:
It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children
"come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking
when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from
shifting economic arrangements."
DrIGr at 144. Dr. Guttmacher should know it doesn't work that way. Easy abortiorl
decreases the use of contraceptives, and this increases the demand for abortion and
the number of abortions performed.
40 410 U.S. at 165 n. 67.

41405 U.S. 645 (1972).

42 Id. at 651.
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A few weeks after Stanley, the Court decided Vanderlaan v.
4 3 a custody case, and Rothstein v. Lutheran Social SerVanderlaan,
vices of Wisconsin,4 4 an adoption case. In each case, the Court reversed a lower court, which had held against the father's rights, and
remanded with instructions to reconsider in light of Stanley. Since
a father, whether married or unmarried, has a constitutional right
to be heard in proceedings for the custody or adoption of the child
he has sired, how is it possible to say that, before birth, the child
may be aborted without a putative father's consent?
If the mother, whether married or unmarried, has a constitutional
right to an abortion, and the father, whether married or unmarried,
is denied the right to veto the abortion, it seems to me that he is
denied the equal protection of the law. This follows from the decision in Stanley in which the Court held (all members concurring) :45
Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children were taken from him and... by denying
him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their children is challenged, the State denied Stanley
the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
So here. If the mother, who conceived the child, is entitled to an
abortion and the father, who begot the child, is denied the right to
protest, he is discriminated against. In Doe v. Doe4 6 a husband specifically challenged the absence of a consent provision in the New
York law. The couple involved had separated before the wife discovered she was pregnant. After the woman told her husband that
she would have an abortion, he obtained a restraining order to stop
her from terminating the pregnancy. Before Doe could serve the
order, his wife entered a hospital and had her abortion. Doe then
obtained an order compelling his wife to show cause why she should
not be held in contempt of court for ignoring the injunction. Doe
presented both constitutional and contractual arguments. These
evidently did not impress the Court, which held the wife not in
contempt. How could she be, since the abortion was performed
before the restraining order was served on her? The important fact
about the case, however, is that a restraining order was issued to
protect the life of his offspring.
43 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
46

44 Ibid.

45 405 U.S. at 649.

Nassau County Sup. Ct. (24 May 1972). See Note, Consent Provisions in

Abortion Statutes, 1 FLA. STATE U.L. REv. 645, 654-55 (1973).
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In the absence of a statutory provision requiring his consent,
Jones v. Smith4 7 held against a putative father who sought to restrain the mother of his unborn child from having an abortion. The
Court bowed respectfully before Wade and Bolton but reached its
decision primarily on state grounds. The Florida statute provided:48
One of the following shall be obtained by the physician
prior to terminating a pregnancy:
(1) The written request of the pregnant woman and if she
is married,the written consent of her husband, unless the husband is voluntarily living apart from the wife.
49
The Florida court held:
The situation in the case under consideration involves neither a married woman nor a "husband." Moreover, the "consent" of a potential putative father is not included within nor is
it required by the terms of the termination of pregnancy law.
Therefore, if we were to resolve this question solely on the
basis of the applicability of the Florida statute, the appellant
would simply have no basis to claim his consent was necessary....
• . Our decision is based upon our interpretation of the
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and
Florida Statute 458.22, F.S.A., as they relate to the right of a
potential putative father to enjoin the natural mother from
terminating her pregnancy. No such "right" exists.
This case is inconsistent with Stanley. It denies the putative father
the equal protection of the law.
If the child is the father's as much as the mother's, is not the
surgeon who performs the abortion liable to the father who has
been thus deprived of the child he begot? In Touriel v. Benveniste,"
47278 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1973), cert. den. 94 S. Ct. 1486 (1974).
481d. at 342. The statute is quoted in the opinion and the emphasis was supplied
by the court.
49 Id. at 342, 344. A number of states require a father's consent to abortion. See,
e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 9.02.070 (1973 Supp.)
Doe v. Rampton, 366 F. Supp. 189 (D.Utah 1973) concerned Utah Code Annotated Title 76, c. 7. Unlike the Florida statute, the Utah Code requires that "[in all
cases, consent must be given by the father of the fetus.' The court held "all of the
statutes and portions of statutes contested herein invalid in toto" It did not discuss the requirement that "consent must be given by the father of the fetus."
No review was sought of the judgment in this case.
50 Civil Docket No. 766790, Los Angeles Super. Ct., 20 October 1961. For a discussion of this case, see The Expectant Father Protected: Tort Action Allowed
againstAbortionist, 14 STAN. L. REv. 901 (1962).
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the husband sued the doctor who had performed an illegal abortion
on plaintiff's wife without his consent. It was held that the plaintiff
had a legally protectable interest in his unborn child, which was
separate from his wife's interest and thus unaffected by her consent.
The Supreme Court has not spoken to this question. In this situation no prudent surgeon will perform an abortion without the
consent of the father as well as the mother. For to do so would be
to invite litigation. And litigation there will be. The Court has
decided that the father has rights after birth. On what ground
could it decide that he has no rights before birth? The Abortion
Cases demonstrate that the Court can do strange things when it
usurps legislative power. It can also change its collective mind and
frequently has done so. 1 The hospital where the abortion is done
may also face the prospect of being sued by an unconsenting father.
V. Tim CHILD IN THE WOMB
In Wade, the Court held that an unborn child is not a person "in the whole sense, ' '52 whatever that means, and thus is not
entitled to the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment. Dean
Prosser, however, had no difficulty in describing an unborn child
as a person: "All writers who have discussed the problem have
joined in condemning the old rule, and in maintaining that the
unborn child in the path of an automobile is as much a person in the
street as the mother."53 Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged) defines "child" as follows: I a : an unborn or
recently born human being : FETUS, INFANT, BABY.
In Carver v. Hooker, decided after the Abortion Cases, the dis54
trict court said:
51 See Burner v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932) (Brandeis,
senting).

J., dis-

52 410 U.S. at 162.
53

Prosser, LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
54 369 F. Supp. 204, 212, 215, 216 (D. N. H. 1973), aff'd, 43 U.S. L. W. 2057 (1st
Cir. 18 July 1974), cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3138 (5 Sept. 1974). Accord, Doe v.
Lukhard, 363 F. Supp. 823 (E.D. Va. 1973) aff'd, 493 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
filed, 43 US.L.W. 3041, 24 May, 1974); Green v. Stanton, 364 F. Supp. 123 (ND.
Ind. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Weaver, 358 F. Supp. 1147
(ND. II. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 155 (7th Cir. 1974); Wisdom v. Norton, 372 F. Supp.
1190 (D. Conn. 1974); Whitfield v. Minter, 368 F. Supp. 798 (D. Mass. 1973);
Stuart v. Canary, 367 F. Supp. 1343 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Harris v. Mississippi State
Dept. of Public Welfare, 363 F. Supp. 1293 (ND. Miss. 1973); Alcala v. Burns, 362
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The narrow question for consideration here is whether or not
New Hampshire's practice of denying the unborn children
of otherwise childless women AFDC [i.e., aid for families
with dependent children] benefits conflicts with the Social
Security Act and is, therefore, illegal under the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution. Cast in these terms, the problem
is the familiar one of statutory interpretation:: Does the phrase
"dependent child," as used in the Social Security Act, include
the unborn children of otherwise pregnant women? . . .
...

one major continuing Congressional concern has been

the development and expansion of prenatal care programs.
This policy is inconsistent with the exclusion of unborn children from the definition of "dependent children" and the
consequent denial of AFDC benefits to pregnant women,
whether otherwise childless or not....
New Hampshire's practice of denying AFDC benefits to
otherwise childless pregnant women is in conflict with the
Social Security Act and, therefore, violates the Supremacy
Clause. Plaintiffs are entitled to a permanent injunction enjoining defendants from denying them AFDC benefits on this
basis.
In a Canadian case, Reynolds v. Reynolds,55 the Supreme Court
of Ontario issued a temporary order restraining "the defendants,
and each of them, their servants and agents, and anyone on their
behalf•., from taking the life of the infant Plaintiff either by performing or undergoing an abortion." Thereupon the mother, a defendant, agreed to bear her child, which she did. A similar case had
been disposed of in the same way a year earlier. 56
In both Canadian cases the Therapeutic Abortion Committee of
the hospital in question had recommended a therapeutic abortion.
F. Supp. 180 (S.D. Iowa 1973), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W. 3208, 15 Oct. 1974.
Contra, Parks v. Harden, 354 F. Supp. 620 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
See also Wagner v. Finch, 413 F.2d 267, 268-69 (5th Cit. 1969): "... the illegitimate child of a deceased father, conceived before but born after, the father's
death, is sufficiently 'in being' to be capable of 'living with' the father at the time
of his death. The fact that a worker dies before the birth of a child already
'in being' is no legal or equitable reason to prohibit that child from benefits." And
see Kyne v. Kyne, 38 Cal. App.2d 122, 127 (1940). Held: An unborn child may
bring suit by a guardian ad litem to compel the father to provide support. The
Court said: "Obviously, a child must be supported both before, as well as after,
birth. It is clearly to the best 'interests' of the child that its father be compelled

to support it, if the mother cannot, prior to its birth. [Support: food, shelter, etc.]"
55

No. 864, S. Ct. of Ontario, 1 November 1973.
56 Roe v. Riverside Hospital, No. 70, S. Ct. of Ontario, 26 January 1972.
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Yet in both cases delivery was normal and the mother suffered no
ill effect.5 7 These cases indicate the unreliability of medical advice
57
that a therapeutic abortion is necessary. a

Professor John T. Noonan, Jr., has pointed out that the mother's
personal right of privacy, on which the Court professes to rely in
Wade, had escaped attention for over a century.5" The Court thus
gives the Constitution an evolving meaning. In respect of "person,"
as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, on the other hand, the Court
gives the Constitution a static meaning. "Person" means exactly
what it meant when the Constitution was adopted. This is another
of the Court's inconsistencies.
Instead of the incomplete history to which he devoted so many

pages in Wade-incomplete because it contains no syllable concerning the genesis, purpose, and adoption of the Fourteenth Amend-

ment-Mr. Justice Blackmun would have been well advised to turn
to modern science. If he had, he could not have written, as he did:5 9
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins.
When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
In fact, of course, the Court decides that life does not begin before live birth. This follows from its repeated references to the
57 The Reynolds baby suffered a dislocated hip. It is not known whether this
happened before, during, or after delivery. In any case, a baby's dislocated hip
can be corrected with little or no difficulty, provided the condition is detected
within three months after birth.
57a There was filed in the Reynolds case, a lengthy affidavit by an experienced
obstetrician and gynecologist, Andreas J.Nuyens, detailing the development of
a fetus in support of his conclusion: "Modern science makes it irrefutably clear that
the unborn offspring of human parents is in fact an autonomous human being qualitatively no different from the born offspring."
58 25 NATIONAL Rlvm-w, 2 March, 1973, 260, 262-63. At page 262 of the same
article Professor Noonan describes the page after page of history which Mr. Justice
Blackmun recounts (but does nor rely on) in Wade as "undigested," indeed "untasted," and as a "charade." Of the Court's holding he says, at 264: "What it is
appropriate for the state to protect is not a human being, but a human being with
the 'capability of meaningful life."' Professor Noonan concludes: "Our old way
of looking on all human existence as sacred is to be replaced by a new ethic more
discriminating in choosing who shall live and who shall die. The concept of
'meaningful life' is at the core of these decisions."
59 410 U.S. at 159.
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"potential" life of the fetus. Thus, with characteristic inconsistency,
the Court does what Mr. Justice Blackmun says it is "not in a position to do."
As suggested above, the Court could have avoided this selfcontradiction if it had consulted modern science. Thus Dr. Jerome
Lejeune, a French geneticist of international fame who discovered
the chromosome abnormality responsible for mongolism, declared
60
at a symposium in Quebec:
[Life] begins... at conception. This is not questioned by any
scientific person.
The fetus is a human being. Genetically he is complete. This
is not an opinion, it is a fact.... At sixty days ... the whole
man is already there. His finger prints are formed. You could
read his palm and give him his identity card.
Dr. Thomas W. Hilgers, former Fellow in Obstetrics and Gynecology at the Mayo Graduate School of Medicine and now teaching at St. Louis University, agrees with Dr. Lejeune. He has
written: "
There is no scientific evidence which would indicate that
human life begins at any other point than the moment of conception (i.e., the union of the egg from the female and the
sperm from the male).
In the midst of the abortion debate, a great deal of time has
been spent on arguing when life begins. It is unfortunate that
so much time has been spent on this question, since the answer
had been known for decades. Human life begins at the moment of conception-at that moment when sperm and egg
unite-and that is a scientific fact! It is at this moment that a
totally new and unique individual, never before in existence
and never again to be duplicated, comes to be.
Mr. Justice Blackmun repeatedly speaks of "the" patient. In fact
there are two patients, the pregnant woman and her unborn child.
62
Dr. Hilgers wrote:
Over the last several years, medicine has developed new
techniques whereby the unborn child can be treated while still
in the womb. The first major development was about ten years
ago when Dr. A. W. Liley, an obstetrician from Auckland,
OuLe Devoir (Montreal), 6 May, 1974, p. 3, col. 1. Translated from the French
by Jeanne Rodes.
62
01 INDucED ABORTION, 1 (2d ed. 1973).
1d. at 9-10.
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New Zealand, first performed an intrauterine transfusion to
treat an infant afflicted with Rh disease. This marked the beginning of the new science of fetology, the study of the unborn, and Dr. Liley is generally considered to be the "father
of fetology."
Since that time a number of other advances have been made,
the most dramatic of which has been the direct surgical operation on the unborn. A pioneer in this field, Dr. Stanley
Asensio, of the University of Puerto Rico School of Medicine, has actually taken the fetus out of the mother's womb,
performed the operation and then placed him back into the
womb only to be later delivered as a healthy, normal child.
The operation is so delicate that the surgeon must use fluidfilled gloves when handling his tiny patient.
The study of the unborn is still a relatively new science and
yet, in its short existence, it has put into perspective what the
obstetrician has known for years, i.e., when working with the
pregnant woman, there are two patients to be considered.
A therapeutic abortion is seldom required. 62 a It is necessary in the
case of cancer of the uterus and conception in the fallopian tube;
in these situations, unless it is done, the death of both mother and
child is a virtual certainty. There may be other conditions indicating a therapeutic abortion, but they are rare and diminishing. 63
A woman determined to have an abortion experiences little difficulty in obtaining medical advice that a termination of her pregnancy is indicated on therapeutic grounds. Since this is so, should
not the fetus be entitled to representation? Its life is at stake, and
will be extinguished for no better reason than that a physician or
committee of physicians, has certified that the mother's life or
health requires it. Considerations of decency and fairness, civilized
instincts, demand the appointment of a guardian ad litem to crossexamine those who have condemned the fetus to death and to produce evidence to rebut the medical reasons advanced in support of
the abortion decision. Mr. Justice Blackmun acknowledged that
"unborn children have been recognized as acquiring rights or
interests by way of inheritance or other devolution of property, and
have been represented by guardians ad litem. '18 4 How much more
appropriate, indeed necessary, when life is at stake?
62a For descriptions of the methods of abortion in general use, see HrGERas &

HORAN, eds., ABORTION
03 Id. at 37-52.

AND SocIAL. JusTIcE

2913 (1972).
84 410 U.S. at 162.
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In Byrn v. New York City Health and Hospital Corp.,65 plaintiff was a guardian ad litem for infant Roe and all similarly situated
members of a class of unborn infants scheduled for abortion in public hospitals under the operation and control of defendant. In that
capacity plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that New York's
1970 abortion "liberalization" statute was unconstitutional. The
Court conceded that an unborn child "is human, if only because it
may not be characterized as not human and it is unquestionably
alive." It held, nevertheless (two judges dissenting), that the question of conferring legal personality on the unborn was a matter of
policy to be decided by the legislature. But no member of the
Court questioned either the propriety of plaintiff's appointment as
guardian ad litem or the propriety of his action in filing suit in that
capacity. And in Klein v. Nassau County Medical Center6 6 a guardian ad litem was permitted to intervene.
In Raleigh Fitkin-PaulMorgan Memorial Hospitalv. Anderson6 7
the hospital brought an action seeking authority to administer blood
transfusions to defendant if they should become necessary to save
her life and the life of her unborn child. Defendant had notified the
hospital that she did not wish blood transfusions for the reason that
they would be contrary to her religious convictions as a Jehovah's
Witness. The Court held: 68
We are satisfied that the unborn child is entitled to the law's
protection and that an appropriate order should be made to
insure blood transfusions to the mother in the event that they
are necessary in the opinion of the physician in charge at the
time.
We have no difficulty in so deciding with respect to the
infant child....
The judgment [which had been against the hospital] is accordingly reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court
with directions (1) to appoint a special guardian for the infant; (2) to substitute such guardian as party plaintiff; (3) to
order the guardian to consent to such blood transfusions as
may be required to preserve the lives of the mother and child;
and (4) to direct the mother to submit to such blood trans05 31 N.Y. 2d 194 (1972), app. dism., 410 U.S. 949 (1973).
66 347 F. Supp. 496 (E.D. N.Y. 1972).
6742 N.J. 421 (1964), cert. den. 377 U.S. 985 (1964).
68 Id. at 423-24.
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fusions and to restrain the defendant husband from interfering
therewith.
Thus the Court placed a higher value on preserving the life of the
unborn child than on the constitutional guarantee of freedom of
conscience and of religion.
VI. THE HOSPITAL
In Doe v. Bellin Memorial Hospital9 the plaintiff sought an
injunction requiring the hospital to make its facilities available to
her for an abortion. The Court upheld the hospital's refusal, say70
ing:
There is no constitutional objection to the decision by a
purely private hospital that it will not permit its facilities
to be used for the performance of abortions. We think it is
also clear that if a state is completely neutral on the question
whether private hospitals shall perform abortions, the state
may expressly authorize such hospitals to answer that question
for themselves.
The Georgia abortion statute which was reviewed in Doe
v. Bolton... contained such a provision. The Supreme Court
did not expressly pass on the validity of that provision, but
since it was attacked in one of the amicus briefs, and since the
Court reviewed the entire statute in such detail, it is reasonable to infer that it considered such authorization unobjectionable.
Thus, we assume that there is no constitutional objection
to a state statute or policy which leaves a private hospital free
to decide for itself whether or not it will admit abortion patients or to determine the conditions on which such patients
will be accepted.
The hospital was the recipient of funds under the Hill-Burton Act
and was subject to detailed regulation by the State of Wisconsin.
These facts were apparently regarded as irrelevant by the Court.
In Indiana the attorney general has ruled that public as well as
private hospitals may refuse abortion patients. 1
69 479 F.2d 756 (7th Cit. 1973). Accord, Watkins v. Mercy Medical Center, 364
F. Supp. 799 (ND. Idaho, 1973); Allen v. Sisters of St. Joseph, 361 F. Supp. 1212
(ND. Tex. 1973); aftd, 490 F.2d 81 (5th Cit. 1974); Chrisman v. Sisters of
St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cit. 1974).
70 479 F.2d at 759-60.

71 Official Op. No. 9 (19 April 1974). This ruling is contrary to the cases which
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VII. TURNING BACK THE CLOCK
As I said above, the Abortion Cases have overruled, sub
silentio, Ferguson v. Skrupa, in which Justice Black, speaking for
the Court, said: "We have returned to the original constitutional
proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to
pass laws."

72

In Munn v. Illinois the Court held: "For protection against
abuses by legislatures the people must resort to the polls, not to
the courts."7 3 Lochner v. New York7 4 and Tyson v. Banton7 5 are
back in the saddle again. In the latter case Justice Holmes, dissenting, said:

7

0

I think the proper course is to recognize that a state legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is restrained by
some express prohibition in the Constitution of the United
States or of the State, and that Courts should be careful not
to extend such prohibitions beyond their obvious meaning by
reading into them conceptions of public policy that the particular Court may happen to entertain.
His dissent, which was joined by Justice Brandeis, eventually was
accepted as the law, and the question became whether or not such
laws as those challenged in Wade and Bolton have a rational relation to a valid state objective.7 7 In view of Wade and Bolton, nobody can say that is still the law.
VIII. AN ALTERNATIVE
It is common knowledge that many people wish to adopt a
baby. Unhappily the demand exceeds the supply; there aren't
enough babies to go around. Hence would-be adoptive parents are
put on a waiting list. In view of Stanley, the consent of the father,
hold that a public hospital must allow abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy.
Cf. Hathaway v. Worcester City Hospital, 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973); Doe v.
Hale Hospital, 500 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1974). There appears to be no absolute duty
to allow abortions in the second and third trimesters. Nyberg v. City of Virginia,
495 F.2d 1342 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. den., 95 S. Ct. 169 (1974).
72 372 US. at 730.
73 94 US. 113, 134 (1876).
75 273 U.S. 418 (1927).
74 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76 Id.at 446.
77 See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
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if he is known, should now be required. If he refuses his consent,
the baby is placed in a foster home pending the outcome of judicial
proceedings. Thus adoptive parents must wait two or three years
before their wish is fulfilled. If there were fewer abortions, there
would be more babies to adopt.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The Abortion Cases have settled nothing. They are full of
contradictions and non sequiturs, so lacking in any basis in the Constitution or prior cases that they cannot stand. Even those who, for
whatever reason, advocate abortion must deplore the Court's shoddy performance, devoid of judicial craftsmanship, in these inex-

cusable cases. Like Minersville School District v. Gobitis8 and
Roth v. United States7 9 sooner or later they will be reversed, expressly or sub silentio.
Indeed, the reversal process already has begun. In Bolton the
Court held:80
Appellants and various amici have presented us with a mass
of data purporting to demonstrate that some facilities other
than hospitals are entirely adequate to perform abortions if
they possess these qualifications [that is, all the staffing and
services necessary to perform an abortion safely]. The State,
on the other hand, has not presented persuasive data to show
that only hospitals meet its acknowledged interest in insuring
the quality of the operation and the full protection of the
patient. We feel compelled to agree with appellants that the
State must show more than it has in order to prove that only
the full resources of a licensed hospital, rather than those of
some other appropriately licensed institution, satisfy these
health interests.
The Chief Justice concurred.
Five months later (on 21 June 1973) that portion of Bolton
quoted in the preceding paragraph was reversed sub silentio by
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slayton.81 The opinion in that case was
written by the Chief Justice (Mr. Justice Blackmun concurring),
82
and the Court held:
78 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
79 354 U.S. 476 (1957).

81413 U.S. 49 (1973).

80 410 U.S. at 195.

82 Id. at 61-63.
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From the beginning of civilized societies, legislators and
judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions.... On
the basis of these assumptions both Congress and state legislatures have, for example, drastically restricted associational
rights by adopting antitrust laws, and have strictly regulated
public expression by issuers of and dealers in securities, profit
sharing "coupons" and "trading stamps," commanding what
they must and may not publish and announce....
The fact that a congressional directive reflects unprovable assumptions about what is good for the people, including
imponderable aesthetic assumptions, is not a sufficient reason
to find that statute unconstitutional.
If we accept the unprovable assumption that a complete
education requires certain books . . . and the well nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the human personality, and develop
character, can we then say that a state legislature may not act
on the corollary assumption that commerce in obscene books,
or public exhibitions focused on obscene conduct, have a tendency to exert a corrupting and debasing impact leading to
antisocial behavior? ... The sum of experience, including that
of the past two decades, affords an ample basis for legislatures
to conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and distorted
by crass commercial exploitation of sex. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and
acting on it legislatively simply because there is no conclusive
evidence or empirical data.
...

Thus Bolton holds that the state has the burden of producing empirical data to support its statutes, while Slayton holds that the state
need not produce empirical data but may rely on unprovable assumptions.
Slayton was decided five months after Wade. Five months after
Slayton, on 5 December 1973, North Dakota State Board of Phar8 3 was decided. In Wade the Court
macy v. Snyder's Drug Stores
relied on the "compelling state interest" test. 4 In the North Dakota
case the Court says nothing about a "compelling state interest."
What it does is to adopt the position of the dissent of Mr. Justice
85
Rehnquist in Wade, as follows:
The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that chal83 414 U.S. 156 (1973).

84 410 U.S. at 155.

85 Id. at 173.
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[1974

lenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective.
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 384 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
And so on. The Abortion Cases will not last. Sooner or later those
monstrous cases will join the long and lengthening list of cases in
which the Court has reversed itself. More than forty years ago Justiee Brandeis, dissenting in Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co.",
collected a goodly number of cases in which the Court had reversed
itself. His list would be much longer today and continues to
grow. This willingness to correct its mistakes is a tribute to the
Court. In time it will correct the mistake it made in the Abortion
7

Cases.s
86
87

285 U.S. 393, 406 n. 1, 407 n. 2 (1932).
Senator Hatfield has said: "Abortion is a form of violence. That is the un-

deniable reality. Like the war in Indochina, it is the destruction of life. It furthers
the dehumanization of life. It cheapens life.

"Abortion is not a Catholic issue. Indeed, as a non-Catholic, I have joined Sen.
James L. Buckley (Cons.-N.Y.) and Sen. Harold E. Hughes (D-Iowa) in introducing Senate Joint Resolution 19. This constitutional amendment, cosponsored by
five other senators, would restore the fundamental right to parenthood." Hatfield,

On Many Fronts We Have Lost Respect for Human Life, Los Angeles Times,
8 August, 1973, Part II at 7.

